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TAKINGS AND STATUTORY ENTITLEMENTS:  
DOES THE TOBACCO BUYOUT TAKE QUOTA 
RIGHTS WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION? 
MATTHEW NIS LEERBERG 
INTRODUCTION 
Several of the prominent domestically grown crops are or have 
been grown under a government-imposed quota system.1 Under such 
a system, Congress creates quota rights that are distributed to 
farmers, providing them with the exclusive right to produce the crop.2 
In the global economy, however, such regulated markets have led to 
ever-decreasing demand for expensive domestic crops.3 Instead, 
manufacturers buy the crops from foreign producers at significant 
price savings.4 Because the quota holders’ property interests are 
calculated as percentages of the domestic crop output, the property 
interests become less valuable as a result, which in turn increases the 
cost of farming domestically.5 
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 1. E.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1311–1316 (2000) (repealed 2004) (tobacco); §§ 1321–1330 (2000) 
(corn); §§ 1331–1340 (2000) (wheat); §§ 1341–1350 (2000) (cotton); §§ 1351–1356 (2000) (rice); 
§§ 1357–1359a (2000) (peanuts). 
 2. See, e.g., § 1313(a) (2000) (repealed 2004). 
 3. The Necessity of a Tobacco Quota Buyout: Why It Is Crucial to Rural Communities and 
the U.S. Tobacco Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Production and Price 
Competitiveness of the Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 108th Cong. 9 (2004) 
[hereinafter Necessity] (statement of Larry Wooten, president, North Carolina Farm Bureau). 
 4. See Thomas C. Capehart, Jr., U.S. Tobacco Industry Responding to New Competitors, 
New Challenges, AMBER WAVES, Sept. 2003, http://www.ers.usda.gov/amberwaves/ 
september03/features/ustobaccoindustry.htm (“With cheaper tobacco available on the world 
market, U.S. tobacco is losing global and domestic market share.”). 
 5. Id. Beyond economic concerns, the legality of the U.S. quota and price-support system 
has been questioned, increasing the uncertainty faced by quota holders. See Danny McKinney, 
Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Association, Season of Change, http://www.burley 
tobacco.com/Default.aspx?tabid=27&mid=399&ctl=Details&ItemID=101 (last visited Feb. 2, 
2006) (noting that the World Trade Organization in 2004 was preparing to evaluate the legality 
of the U.S. quota and price support system). 
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Recent changes to tobacco law illustrate the rising inefficacy of 
quota systems and problems arising from their dissolution. With the 
passing of the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 
(FETRA, more commonly referred to as the Buyout)6 as part of the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,7 tobacco became the first 
American crop to move instantaneously from a government-
regulated market to a free-market system.8 Thus, tobacco presents a 
ready case study in whether the elimination of a regulatory quota 
system constitutes a compensable taking. 
The market for domestically grown tobacco had contracted by 
half from 1998 to 2004.9 As a result, the amount of tobacco that a 
quota holder may produce has similarly decreased by over 50 
percent.10 Moreover, the signing of the Master Settlement Agreement 
(MSA)11 in 1998 between tobacco manufacturers and several states 
has led to an increase in the cost of producing tobacco.12 
Not surprisingly, tobacco quota holders and their representatives 
have been clamoring for years for buyout legislation that would 
eliminate the crippled quota system while justly compensating quota 
holders for their property interest in the quota rights.13 Quota holders 
have witnessed several failed attempts at passing such a buyout.14 
 
 6. Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 601–643, 118 Stat. 1418, 1521–36 (2004). This Note will use 
“FETRA” to refer to the act itself, and “the Buyout” to refer to the program as a whole. 
 7. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. at 1418. 
 8. Kelly Tiller, Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, The U.S. Tobacco Buyout, at slide 2 
(Nov. 1, 2004), http://agpolicy.org/tobuy/ITGA-Tiller-US_Tobacco_Buyout-1Nov2004.ppt. 
Although peanut quotas were eliminated by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 
2002, former peanut producers remain eligible for other types of support and tariffs. Pub L. No. 
107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002); see Capehart, supra note 4 (noting that unlike tobacco producers, 
former peanut producers “may also be eligible for other types of support (such as direct 
payments, marketing assistance loans, counter-cyclical payments) and are protected by high 
import tariffs”). 
 9. See Tiller, supra note 8, at slide 7 (demonstrating graphically that the total flue-cured 
and burley quotas fell from 1.7 billion pounds per year in 1998 to 0.8 billion pounds per year in 
2004). 
 10. Id. at slide 6–7; Necessity, supra note 3, at 47 (testimony of D. Keith Parrish, CEO, 
National Tobacco Growers Association). 
 11. See infra Part I.B. 
 12. One community leader noted, “For nearly every grower, the 2004 crop will be the 
smallest ever produced. Yet, the 2004 crop will be the most expensive I have ever grown on my 
farm.” Necessity, supra note 3, at 12 (statement of Sam Crews, president, North Carolina 
Tobacco Growers Association). 
 13. Quota holders and their representatives believe that the elimination of the quota 
system without just compensation would indeed effect a taking. See, e.g., The Tobacco Quota 
Buyout: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Agric., 108th Cong. 4 (2003) [hereinafter Quota] 
